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ABSTRACT 
Megaprojects involve managing external stakeholders with diverse interests. Using an Indian 
megaproject case study, we discuss strategies used to manage them such as: persuasion, 
deputation, give and take, extra work for stakeholders, and flexibility. Drawing from theories and 
frameworks of power, we explain how these strategies emerge through a process of tactical 
clustering. We also analyze the resources available to the project team – such as recruitment 
discretion, government backing, and fund discretion – that influence these power dynamics and 
enable these strategies. We posit that changes in the resource base can significantly affect strategic 
action and, in turn, megaproject outcomes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Quantitatively, megaprojects can be classified as projects costing more than one billion USD 
(Flyvbjerg, 2014); qualitatively, these projects are colossal, costly, controversial, complex with 
multiple loci of contested control (Frick, 2005; Clegg et al. 2017). Despite their growth in number 
and opportunities to learn from these globally, their failure to reach expectations (Flyvbjerg, 2014) 
signifies a ‘performance paradox’. In addition to flawed project management such as implicit 
optimism biases (Flyvbjerg, 2008), explicit strategic misrepresentation (Wachs, 1989), a lack of 
upfront planning (Morris, 1994) and the use of rigid contracts in conditions of uncertainty 
(Stinchcombe and Heimer 1985), pluralism has been seen as another explanation for problems in 
megaproject delivery (Gil, 2015). Megaprojects combine multiple competing partners with 
different interests, values, and rationality (Van-Marrewijk, 2015), creating pluralistic sites in 
which power is diffused among distributed actors and conflicting institutional logics are evident 
(Biesenthal et al. 2018). Pluralistic settings, in the context of the features already elaborated make 
standard project management routines for decision-making processes more difficult to implement 
(Denis et al., 2001). Not only do various sponsors and experts provide diverse engineering and 
design solutions but external stakeholders will have conflicting diagnoses of problems and 
prescriptions that may be opposed to the project’s goals (Miller et al. 2017; Mok et al., 2015).  
We adopt Mitchell et al’s (1997) broad definition of stakeholders, which includes virtually 
anyone that that can have an impact on the organization’s actions or who experiences an impact as 
a result of them. Stakeholders are in a position to influence the wellbeing of an organization, 
defined in terms of its capacity to achieve goals (Freeman, 1984); thus, they are significant in the 
project context (Achterkamp & Vos, 2008). In their review of stakeholder literature in projects, 
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Littau et al. (2010) note that stakeholders can be classified in three ways, (1) those who have an 
interest in the project; (2) those who can affect the project, and (3) those that both have an interest 
in and can affect the project. Mok et al., (2015) stress that stakeholder management in megaprojects 
is more complex than in small-scale projects because there are many more stakeholders. Not only 
are there more; they are not as easy to identify due to the limited cognition of project managers in 
regard to the boundaries of stakeholder inclusion. Stakeholders of the most unexpected kinds can 
materialize from unlikely places, such as the natural environment (Clegg & Kornberger, 2015).  
External stakeholders – stakeholders outside the project organization – present more 
complexities than internal stakeholders who, in principle, will be subject to contractual regulation. 
These diverse external stakeholders may articulate conflicting representations of many of the 
specifics of the planned megaproject (Szyliowicz & Goetz, 1995; Olander &Landin, 2008), such 
as its basic design, function and alignment, the users for whom it caters, its impact on communities, 
the effect of project operations on land use, amenity and values, the utilities that the project will 
disrupt, the construction methods adopted, etc. Stakeholders spread across different organizations 
will have different interpretations of the specifics of the megaproject, and may well stand in an 
adversarial relation to the project strategies, goals and practices. These representations occur 
during all stages in the project lifecycle (Aaltonen & Kujala, 2010) and may be enacted through a 
range of measures that include lobbying, political action, petitioning, negotiating and influencing 
as well as direct action (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Aaltonen et al. 2008). These actors are also referred to 
as ‘stakeholders of the shadows’ (Winch, 2017) as they seek to shape major megaproject decisions 
including budget and scope in accord with specific vested interests, sometimes subtly, other times 
less so. Thus, megaprojects present ample opportunities for capturing and demonstrating 
individualized forms of public benefit rather than ones that are collective (Lehrer & Laidley, 2008). 
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Multiple studies have demonstrated that complying with the demands of external stakeholders can 
lead to scope creep (Shapiro & Lorenz, 2000) and escalation of commitments (Ross & Staw, 1986) 
on the part of the project team – a prime reason for the underperformance of infrastructure 
megaprojects (Gil, 2015; Mok et al., 2015). 
Troubled stakeholders sprout during the course of a project much as mushrooms after a deluge. 
While the project team’s interest is in completing the project as per the contracted scope, budget 
and timelines, external stakeholders have representational interests that involve no obligations or 
responsibilities to such parameters. Moreover, where the project team depends on external 
stakeholders to complete the project, especially in situations in which there is no reciprocal 
dependency from the stakeholders, the latter may well have power without responsibility. External 
stakeholders in infrastructure megaprojects thus straddle porous boundaries, are frequently 
ungovernable and cannot be held accountable to the project’s scope, budget and timelines. Since 
governance instruments such as contracts and conformance to standards are unavailable to govern 
these stakeholders, project teams muddle through with short-term tactics that, temporally, cohere 
into strategies. We aim to understand what these strategies are and how they vary with contexts. 
We see these strategies as emergent constellations of tactics strategically bundled together, 
dependent on the resources available and oriented to specific stakeholder issues. We use an 
organizational power based approach to understand the dynamics of managing external 
stakeholders using strategies, which we now describe. 
2. ORGANIZATIONAL POWER  
A recently published special issue on megaprojects in the Project Management Journal (PMJ) 
stresses that megaproject success is often driven by power related factors (Söderlund et al. 2017). 
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The complexity and interrelatedness of major projects opens them to equally complex and 
interrelated social relations of power, political process and conflict (Pinto, 1996; Marshall, 2006). 
Megaprojects are delivered by organizational entities socially constructed by relations of power 
both inter- and intra-organizationally (Clegg & Kreiner, 2013). A large part of project 
managements’ political work seeks to marshal, coordinate, orchestrate and control internal and 
external entities’ resistance. Where actors seek to advance their vested interests they will use power 
relations to do so, enacting and creating conflicts of interest (Schwenk, 1989).  
One of the earliest sociological definitions of power was that of Max Weber who defines power 
as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship would be in a position to carry out 
his own will despite resistance” (Weber, 1947). More recently, power has been understood as a 
phenomenon either structurally lodged in multiple dimensions (Lukes, 1974; Fleming and Spicer, 
2014) or as flowing through multiple circuits (Clegg 1989; Clegg et al, 2006). The most common 
structural distinction is between the overt dimensions of power and those that are more covert. 
Overt power involves the direct exercise of power easily observable when some agency seeks 
compliance with its directives on the part of some other agency such as an individual, a team, an 
organization, or even a material artifact. Covert power, however, cannot be as easily observed as 
this power tends to be congealed into more enduring institutional structures, practices and taken-
for-granted ideas through which the flows of overt power relations ebb and swell as per the circuits 
of power theory (Clegg, 1989). The circuits of power framework offers an explicit mechanism for 
tracing the exercise of power (Lapsley & Giordano, 2010). Here, overt power depends on ‘standing 
relations’ such as the existing rules and practices, which are part of the covert circuit. The resources 
available to the project team can be considered as part of these existing rules and practices which 
determine the episodic action, or the strategies used (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001). These existing 
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practices are sometimes referred to as ‘hidden structures of power’ or ‘deep structures’ (Clegg, 
1975; Allen & Kern, 2001) as people tacitly accept and reproduce them.  
In managing external stakeholders, whose enactment as such is project specific and thus 
bounded by specific times and spaces, project managers typically use more overt power. Largely, 
this power is constituted in relation to stakeholders that strive to resist or influence the project in 
some ways. Project teams’ overt responses to the claims of external stakeholders may embrace any 
of adaptation, compromise, avoidance or dismissal as evolving responses to dynamic situations 
(Aaltonen & Sivonen, 2009). Some strategic responses recorded on the part of project teams 
include (re)framing (Mastos et al, 2015) and fair process approaches (Kim & Mauborgne, 2003). 
Other strategies include the use of negotiations, trade-offs, incentives and concessions (Chinyio & 
Akintoye, 2008; Yang et al. 2014) for handling the relational consequences of interests being 
vested in megaprojects (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003). While such literature has documented means 
to manage external stakeholders, there is a lack of evidence concerning when, why and how 
strategies can be used in different contexts. Institutionalized power relations embedded in broader 
structures of hegemony and domination tend to come more into focus as different tactical 
responses to differentially powerful agencies and actors cohere into strategically distinct 
repertoires of action. Hence, understanding the project team’s response to stakeholder resistance 
through emergent strategic practices (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) and resources which enable 
these practices can be of substantial value in understanding how a project’s scope can be better 
managed. 
Building upon Dahl’s (1957) concept of power as providing ‘one with the ability to make 
another do something they would not otherwise do,’ consideration of what kinds of resources are 
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capable of being mobilized to achieve the desired effect has ensued. In what is perhaps the most 
influential research in this area, French & Raven (1959) suggest five generic bases of power: 
coercive, reward, legitimate, expert and referent power. Coercive power is the power to punish for 
non-compliance and is dependent on fear of the negative results from failing to comply, Reward 
power is the opposite of coercive power and is dependent on the positive rewards obtained by 
complying. Legitimate power represents the formal authority to control and use organizational 
resources based on one’s structural position in the organization. Expert power involves the 
possession of some special knowledge, skill, or expertise. Referent power is the power of being a 
role model. Even though the use of these resources is sensitive to context, they can be used as a 
means of advancing knowledge and building on past contributions. The act of acquiring, 
developing and using resources in power relations to obtain a preferred outcome (Pfeffer, 1992) is 
referred to as the use of influence tactics. Influence tactics in turn are dependent on the resources 
brought to bear on power relations (Wilensky, 1967).  
Influence tactics have been broadly classified into nine types: rational persuasion, inspirational 
appeal, consultation, ingratiation, exchange, personal appeal, coalition, legitimating, and 
pressuring (Yukl & Tracey, 1992; Kipnis et al., 1980). Rational persuasion uses logical arguments 
and factual evidence to persuade subjects. Inspirational appeal enthuses by appealing to the 
subject’s values or ideals. Consultation invites participation in planning and policy making. 
Ingratiation flatters the subject into doing something. Exchange exploits the norm of reciprocity. 
Personal appeal leverages loyalty and friendship. Coalition conjoins others in alliance. 
Legitimating claims the authority or right to make the decision. Pressure involves the use of 
demands, threats, or persistent reminders to influence the subject to do what the agent wants. 
Literature exploring the use of such tactics in organizations consider the direction of usage (Kipnis, 
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et al., 1980), sources of power (Yukl, et al., 1996), content of games (Yukl, et al., 1999), culture 
(Fu & Yukl, 2000) and leader’s quality (Cable & Judge, 2003). Figure 1 consolidates literature on 
how the use of influence tactics varies with the sources of power available. 
 
Figure 1: Relation between bases of power and influence tactics (compiled from literature) 
Agents with high expertise will seek to use rational persuasion (Hinkin, & Schriesheim, 1990; 
Yukl et al. 1996) while those that dominate power relations can often eschew rationality (Flybjerg, 
1998). The dominant are more inclined to use coercive power as a source of pressure (Yukl & 
Tracey, 1992), while the use of legitimating rhetoric (Yukl & Michel, 2006) and rational 
persuasion (Hinkin, & Schriesheim, 1990) tend to be weapons of those that do not dominate, 
according to Flyvbjerg (1998). Agents with strong referent power resort to consultation and 
inspirational or personal appeals (Yukl et al. 1996) as well as rational persuasion (Hinkin, & 
Schriesheim, 1990). Exchange tactics involve a promise of reward in exchange for compliance, 
relying on reward power (Yukl & Falbe, 1990). The influence tactics of coalition and ingratiation 
differ from others as both are typically used from a position of lack of power (Hinkin, & 
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Schriesheim, 1990). Tactics are used in combination as well as singly: for instance, Falbe & Yukl 
(1992) note that when ingratiation is used in combination with rational persuasion better outcomes 
are achieved.  
The literature surveyed has largely been developed in social psychology, focusing on 
individual’s tactics for securing influence; hence, these characteristic tactics are strongly oriented 
towards dyadic relations arranged hierarchically in terms of supervision and superordination, being 
supervised and subordinated. It needs to be ascertained whether similar tactics can be identified in 
a multi-organization project level of analysis such as a megaproject, how they are enabled by 
configurations of resources and how clusters of such tactics can become represented as strategic 
action in contexts in which the presence of government and multiple superordinate agencies is 
paramount in shaping the arenas in which stakeholders operate. In this paper, we address these 
issues by posing two research questions: First, What bundles of tactics characterize the emergent 
strategies used in managing external stakeholders? Second, How do these strategies relate to 
available power resources? 
3. RESEARCH SETTING AND METHOD 
We conducted a case study of the ABC (fictive name) metro rail megaproject in South India to 
understand the external stakeholder management practices. Metro rail projects in India started with 
the Kolkata Metro in 1972 and following the success of the Delhi Metro began to be taken up 
throughout the country (Asokan, 2015). A majority of the infrastructure projects in India are 
significantly delayed due to land acquisition issues (Sawhney et al, 2014; Iyer & Sagheer, 2009; 
Thomas et al, 2003). The process of acquiring land in India is very time consuming and can take 
up to three years, even when resistance is absent (Mahalingam & Vyas, 2011). Land acquisition 
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policy in India, as in China, advocates ‘reasonable compensation’ for direct losses, meaning that 
only the value of the land will be compensated in contrast to the ‘value to the owner’ principle 
followed in Australia and Hongkong and the ‘just compensation’ policy followed in the USA and 
UK (refer Mahalingam & Vyas, 2011 for a comparison of land acquisition in India with other 
countries). Bureaucratic inertia (Sawhney et al, 2014), permit risks (Iyer & Sagheer, 2009), and 
the lack of support (Thomas et al, 2003) are also stressed as critical factors for the delay in 
infrastructure projects in India. Delays due to utility relocation are also significant, often observed 
to be in the range of 5-52 months in a study of 11 infrastructure projects in India (Vilventhan & 
Kalidindi, 2018). The critical factors causing these delays are slow response from utility agencies, 
difficulty in identification of the nature and location of underground utilities often due to lack of 
information, as well as conflict between agencies (Vilventhan & Kalidindi, 2016). Thus, the 
construction of a new project in collaboration with other infrastructure services is a complex 
process which requires multiple organizations to collaborate (van-Marrewijk, 2018). Based on this 
context, we limit our focus of external stakeholders to ‘stakeholders in land’ and ‘stakeholders in 
existing services’.   
The ABC project has a planned cost of USD 2.2 billion and thus satisfies the quantitative 
requirement of being a megaproject (cost greater than USD 1 billion). The project was proposed 
as the answer to the traffic demands of a rapidly growing city. It was conceived in 2007 and had 
multiple objectives, including boosting the economic growth of the city and reducing pollution. 
The phase 1 of the project consisted of two corridors of a total length of 45.1 kilometres which had 
both elevated and underground sections with the majority (55%) underground. The project would 
cut across multiple utilities including sewers, water mains, telecommunication cables, electricity 
cables and so on, and the megaproject construction would require these utilities to be uninterrupted 
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during the construction. Lands are permanently required for depots, stations, running sections, 
ramps, car parking space, ventilation shafts, property development and power stations which are 
acquired from both private and government land holders. For the successful implementation of the 
project, a special purpose vehicle was set up as a joint venture with the federal government of India 
and the state government.  
We identify the prevalent external stakeholder management strategies in this infrastructure 
megaproject to understand the power dynamics surrounding them. To do this we adopted a 
qualitative research methodology. Scholars have suggested such a method when the aim is to gain 
familiarity with a problem or to generate new insights for future research (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Single cases in particular provide excellent opportunities to enhance contextual understanding 
because of their depth in data collection and analysis (Lundin & Steinthorsson, 2003).  
The data was collected mainly through face-to-face semi-structured interviews (Spradley, 
1979) with project team members. Given the primary interest in the strategies used we interviewed 
members of the project team who enacted them. We sought insights concerning the external 
stakeholders encountered, the interests and demands these stakeholders posed for the project, and 
the resources and strategies used by the project team to manage the stakeholders. We conducted a 
retrospective case study on the phase which had been completed and inaugurated six months prior 
to fieldwork, which enabled us to talk to the project team, still in situ carrying out some of the 
finishing items. Thus, the participants could recall several recent, specific incidents relating to their 
experience with managing external stakeholders. 
Data collection was conducted over a three-month period in 2017. We conducted a total of 18 
interviews with 15 members of both the project organization and the contractor organizations’ 
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project team which together added up to 25 hours of interview data. The participants were 
restricted to the top management team of the project such as General Managers, Deputy General 
Managers, and Managers. Each interview ranged from a minimum of 1 hour to a maximum of 
around 3 hours. Whenever the project team cited challenges, we asked for specific vignettes from 
the project to anchor and triangulate instances with other respondents. These examples of 
organizational storytelling tap into deep experiences of project life as a source of scientific 
development as Flyvbjerg (2006) notes. We conducted a second round of interview with three 
participants and compared comments made by various respondents on a given issue that emerged 
as the locus of the storytelling, to increase internal consistency and validity of our data (Yin, 1984). 
We also triangulated the data with reports and news articles published on the issues that the 
respondents cited. The contextual data in the findings were anchored in existing literature on Indian 
megaprojects for validation. We transcribed our interviews and then coded the data. 
We went through each of the interview transcripts and extracted every reported incident or 
story that involved external stakeholders and their demands and the ways in which the project team 
managed them. Each of these incidents was assigned to a category. We initially started by talking 
to the project team about the challenges they faced from external stakeholders. We created two 
broad categories of stakeholders – stakeholders in lands and stakeholders in existing services – 
into which we coded relevant data. As we surveyed more issues, we were able to create sub-
categories such as ‘Stakeholders in lands acquired for construction purposes’ within that category. 
After this, we probed into details of how issues that arose in each category were managed, which 
enabled us to capture the strategies and resources that the project team used to manage the interests 
of each of these external stakeholders. These enabling strategies and resources were derived from 
data, iterated as the data ‘talked back’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006), summarized in tabular form (Eisenhardt, 
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1989), and were anchored in the ‘influence tactics’ theoretical framework and the ‘bases of power’ 
theoretical framework respectively.  
4. FINDINGS 
The data we collected from the ABC megaproject was spread across two external stakeholder 
categories – stakeholders in lands and stakeholders in existing services. We now discuss each of 
these stakeholder categories in detail.  
STAKEHOLDERS IN LANDS 
We discuss separately situations where stakeholders’ land is acquired for construction purposes or 
disrupted due to construction. 
Lands acquired for construction purposes 
The land required for construction purposes had to be acquired from multiple landowners 
involving both private and government owners. In some cases, the land was held and occupied 
legally and in other cases the land might be legally owned by an entity but occupied illegally by a 
section of the population squatting on that land – not an uncommon phenomenon in India. Land 
held legally might be owned either by private owners or government agencies.  
The existing land acquisition act in India has provisions for private lands being acquired for 
‘public purposes’, such as infrastructure development, by compensating the owner with a 
government guideline land value. Such valuation is often significantly lower than the market value 
of the property. Therefore, when a request for land acquisition is made, the owners typically will 
not give up the land voluntarily but go to the courts and submit reasons as to why the land should 
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not be compulsorily purchased. The reasons vary: typically, they might include proposals that 
alternative land is available for construction or that the land in question is the only resource that 
the family owns. Many infrastructure projects in India are critically delayed and even stalled due 
to the long litigation processes accompanying the attempts to acquire land (Singh, 2012; Iyer & 
Sagheer, 2009). The megaproject we researched adopted some specific strategies to mitigate issues 
in acquiring land from private owners. The ABC project organization decided to compensate the 
private owners with market rates to reduce litigation and complete the project on schedule. As a 
General Manager of the ABC project organization informed us: 
“One ground of land in this region actually cost INR 2 Crores [USD 320,000] while the 
guideline value of the same was INR 60 Lakhs [USD 94,000]. We were able to acquire land as 
we paid market prices.” 
In cases when private landowners were still reluctant to relinquish their land the acquisition 
team would personally visit them, seeking to convince them to give up their land for the ‘public 
good.’ Particular problems were encountered with land that housed religious and cultural 
buildings, such as temples and statues, because of their deeply symbolic value. In these cases, the 
project team would agree to construct a similar building in an alternative area using traditional 
temple contractors to satisfy the stakeholders. Such a humanistic approach to land acquisition in 
order to reduce time was noted in other megaprojects in India, such as the Konkan railway 
(Ashokan, 2015), where the project team provided existing market rates as compensation for land 
acquisition and even shifted a cemetery because of its constitution as a space of symbolic familial 
sentiment. 
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There are no such land acquisition guidelines for acquiring lands from government bodies. In 
the case under consideration this included land held by the Indian Army, Railways and Airport 
Authority. Since there is no mandate for these government bodies to give up their land they simply 
refused to relinquish control, an approach that in the past has caused many projects simply to avoid 
planning to use land that belonged to other government bodies. In our case, one of the aims of the 
megaproject was to increase interconnectivity for an existing transportation system. The ABC 
project sought to connect the airport and rail network and thus it required hubs close to their 
facilities. After repeated rounds of talks, the railway and airport authority agreed to give some land 
for the construction of the elevated metro rail station to the project. The terms varied.  
The airport agreed to this only if the structural construction within the airport premises could 
be handled by the airport themselves. They used this opportunity to design the station in a way that 
was aesthetically similar to the design of the airport, using many steel members, even constructing 
an extra level of parking for airport employees. The ABC project team had freedom to use funds 
for purposes such as speeding up the construction of the metro rail. On this issue, one senior 
manager from the ABC project organization remarked, 
“They [airport] also want something from us ... This [parking for airport employees] is an 
added facility for them ... these kinds of projects work that way only ... give and take ...” 
Railways, however, had a different set of demands. Railways had for a long time planned to 
extend an existing route. The land for the new railway station had been acquired but construction 
had not commenced due to last mile connectivity issues with the station, as a result of land 
acquisition challenges. The ABC project planned to build an elevated metro rail station on the 
same land as the new railway station and thus achieve interconnectivity between the two 
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transportation networks. The railways asked the ABC project organization also to construct their 
new railway station in exchange for the land.  
Large chunks of land near the airport were held by the Indian Army and thus land acquisition 
from them was unavoidable. The talks with the Indian Army for the land did not work out as 
planned. The Indian Army sought an equivalent value of land elsewhere in the state. A small area 
of land in the city would amount, in equivalent value terms, to a vast area outside the city limits. 
However, the ABC project organization was unable to acquire the large area requested for this 
purpose. Consequently, the project had to scrap the plan for a depot as well as an elevated station 
exit and had to change the viaduct route all of which had been planned earlier on Indian Army 
land. The new viaduct route had to have sharper turns that meant the adoption of a construction 
methodology that was far more expensive than planned. These design and methodology changes 
were enabled by the ABC project, accommodating experts’ experiences gained from other metros 
in India as well as in other countries across the world. As an official in-charge of trackwork 
construction remarked: 
“People are hired from Singapore metro, Delhi metro, etc., and they are given good positions 
too... even juniors, we [ABC project organization] give promotion and have accommodated 
here in higher positions” 
Government lands are sometimes occupied by illegal landholders who, by definition, lack the 
authority to be there: they are squatters, often occupying and using the land for generations; in 
other cases, people might be tricked into buying government lands offered by touts using fake sale 
deeds.  
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Illegal landholders occupying government lands would, in most cases, be politically supported 
by local politicians or social movements. Many projects that had tried to remove them in the past 
had failed. In the ABC project case, there were a section of squatters who occupied land close to 
the airport runway. The project required this illegally occupied land for connectivity to the airport. 
Since the ABC project was a project of considerable political interest, the Deputy Chief Minister, 
a very influential political person in the area, came and spoke to the squatters, asking them to move 
elsewhere. Elected representatives hold a significant position in Indian society. Ashokan (2015) 
mentions similar instances where the central railway minister who was in support for the Konkan 
railway was able to persuade the state’s chief minister and administrations in its favour. 
Landholders with illegal titles were a different category to the squatters. These were people 
that had been cheated into purchasing government lands that they now occupied by ‘con artists’ 
making false claim to the land title. These actors had paid the market value for the land but lacked 
legitimate legal title. Until they received notice from the ABC project organization stating that the 
land they occupied was government land and now was allotted to the ABC project for construction, 
these landholders were unaware that they were illegal occupants. These cases were quite complex 
in terms of project negotiations. In the case of the ABC project the project team went to these 
illegal landholders and convinced them that while ABC project was entitled to use the full land for 
construction purposes the project required only a portion of the land in question: the remainder 
could still be occupied. The project team, made up of employees recruited on a contractual basis, 
warned the residents that if they went to court, they might end up losing all the land. Employees 
that were contracted, compared to government team members bound by the rules of bureaucracy, 
had more freedom to act and not be held accountable for doing so. As an official who was recruited 
on a contractual basis for five years remarked: 
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“The full land which they [illegal land holders who were cheated] occupy is legally given to 
us [ABC project organization] by the government ... if we take the land by force, they may go 
to court ... so we talked to them and warned them [persuaded] that they would lose the full 
land if they go to court ... If they agree now, we will only take what is required for our 
construction and spare the rest” 
Through this strategy of creating fear, and threatening legal process, the ABC project was able 
to save valuable time in dealing with these stakeholders to acquire the required land. Similarly, 
Ashokan (2015) noted how solving politically motivated environmental protests in Goa during the 
construction of the Konkan railway involved the central railway ministry sending a memo to the 
state government to pressure the government backed protesters, warning them that the state 
government would be liable to pay for delays caused. 
Lands on which construction had an impact 
Some landholders objected that the ABC project team was tunnelling under their private land. In 
such cases the project team asserted that, similar to the situation with mineral resources, 
landholders did not have legal rights to what lies 20 metres below their land. In another instance, 
when the landholders complained about the project blocking the entrance to their houses, the 
project team altered their designs to change the pier distances to accommodate stakeholder interest. 
Ecological considerations also came into play. A total of 385 trees had to be cut down for 
construction of the ABC project. When the community around which the project was housed raised 
concerns about this, the project team resolved to plant around 59,000 trees and saplings throughout 
the area where the project had an impact. The community also expressed concerns at the reduction 
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of park areas to enable the construction of the project. In response, the project team agreed to 
develop and maintain parks under the metro rail viaducts and on the station land. Unused lands 
owned by the highway department that were near the metro rail stations were converted to parks 
and subsequently were to be maintained by the project organization. The project team also agreed 
to renovate the parks affected due to construction after the construction was completed. Similarly, 
during the construction works of the Konkan Railway (Ashokan, 2015) the project team gifted 
wells, pipes, culverts and roads to the community affected due to construction.  
Megaprojects in construction are noisy, dirty and draining of energy. The construction and 
operation of the metro rail was criticised by landholders along its alignment for its noise and 
vibration impact. The project team agreed to monitor these levels frequently and take adequate 
steps to keep their impact within permissible limits. In terms of energy, the metro rail project 
operates on electricity, represented as being an environmental friendly and clean alternative to 
diesel. However, the project is housed in a city which suffers from electricity outages which the 
metro rail, it was feared, would exacerbate. To address the concerns of the community at large – 
in particular those residents who lived close to the metro - about the project drawing electricity 
from the common pool and thus increasing disruptions due to power outages, the project team 
agreed to install solar panels on all metro stations and in other locations accessible to the project. 
The team stated that they would export the surplus energy produced to the grid to address the needs 
of the community at large. 
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STAKEHOLDERS IN EXISTING SERVICES 
The megaproject was situated within an existing urban system and during its construction and 
operation many existing services would be adversely affected. The agencies responsible for these 
services, not surprisingly, put the interests of their organizations before those of the megaproject.  
A network of services such as electricity, drinking water, sewerage, telecommunication etc., are 
required for the welfare of the population in the city and disruption to any of these affect the 
business and livelihood of many residents. Most of the construction work for the stations and 
viaduct for the elevated stretch were located beside the highway, which was also the site of all 
underground utilities.  
Coordination with the utility owners was required to ascertain the position of utilities, to shift 
these and to repair/restore utilities damaged during construction. The ABC project organization 
and the contractor organization mandated to construct the project approached these utility owners, 
seeking their cooperation. Arranging appointments with the government staff of these agencies 
proved troublesome due to multiple bureaucratic procedures - oftentimes the contractor 
representative would spend hours waiting and never be able to make the planned appointment. To 
counter delays the ABC project organization hired employees on deputation from these utility 
owners, such as the electricity, water and sewerage boards and from the government 
telecommunication board for a period of four to five years to facilitate construction. These recruits, 
being from the same utility organization, had good relations with their colleagues, thereby 
speeding up the utility shifting process. The ABC megaproject had adequate political support to 
request the state government bureaucracy to deputize staff from other government agencies to 
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enable better coordination. One of the top officials in the Human Resource Department in the ABC 
project organization commented: 
“We [ABC project organization] are given authority by the Chief Secretary [of the state 
government] to get anyone deputed on board from other agencies [government] for long-term 
coordination” 
These deputed employees represent the ABC project and sit at the project site as their main job 
is site related work. On the day to day work of the deputed employees, the Joint General Manager 
of construction works mentioned: 
“Whenever electric issues are intersecting our work, these fellows [deputed employees from 
electricity board] will go and deposit the amount to their office, coordinate shifting etc., 
because without knowing, we cannot touch their work” 
The deputed employees also helped the project in indecisive situations as they played a role in 
fruitful discussions, often leading to solutions with mutual benefits. In cases where electricity 
disruption was inevitable, the electricity board asked the ABC project organization to arrange 
alternative supply with their specialised list of contractors (due to safety and supervisory reasons).  
In some instances with the drinking water and sewerage board, the project team, following 
instructions from the water authorities, had to shift these heavy utilities to a new location 
temporarily and then replace them back in the old location after construction works were complete. 
Through the ABC project organization undertaking to do these works many bureaucratic 
procedures were avoided and time lost due to delayed action by the utility agency was saved but 
at the cost of increased project expenditure. In one case, the construction of a station foundation 
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could not occur as planned because of the presence of water lines that proved impossible to move 
and thus the ABC project organization had to change the design of the foundation they were 
building, based on the available land. An official who was involved in this design change 
commented, 
“We [design team] will be designing piles beautifully, but only once the excavation starts we 
will be able to know the real challenges underneath ... the challenges faced mainly were 
because of utilities and not due to ground conditions ... we sometimes had to adjust [be flexible] 
for the utilities and use eccentric foundation designs to accommodate the utilities” 
The government telecommunication utility was very particular about the disruption of their 
services, including telephonic and Internet connections. Unlike the electricity and water sectors 
this sector had undergone liberalization and hence there were many private players who own and 
operate the network competing with the governmental agency. The government 
telecommunication agency regarded any disruption of this service severely with heavy fines on the 
project, as it would result in a loss of business to competitors. On some occasions the ABC project 
organization had to shift these telecommunication utilities at their own cost and build quite a few 
‘state of the art’ inspection chambers at the request of the government agencies, as informants 
reported:  
“We [ABC project organization] were asked [by the telecommunication government agency] 
to install new and modern cabling system with inspection chambers in place of the conventional 
cabling systems that we wanted to shift ... We did it for them free of cost [extra work for 
stakeholders] even though we were not obliged to do so” 
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The private telecom utilities responded quite differently compared to the government 
counterparts. When the metro rail organisation informed them about their lines in the construction 
zone and requested that they shift them, these private agencies responded quickly and either shifted 
the utility or made alternative arrangements at their own cost. They were proactive, shown in the 
way that regarded the risk of service disruption as more pressing than a lack of revenue. 
The project team had to handle roadway traffic during construction as the metro rail viaducts 
were planned along the median strip of the highway. The highway network is under the control of 
the Highways Department while the Traffic Police Department is responsible for maintaining an 
uninterrupted traffic flow. To enable coordination, the ABC project organization received a high-
level police officer and a senior official from the highways department on a deputised basis to 
enable relatively seamless coordination. Whenever construction work required a longer period 
than anticipated, the project team proposed diversions and received approval from the highway 
department and traffic police department. To achieve these approvals, the ABC project 
organization submitted traffic diversion plans to their offices and even showed live simulations on 
how the new diversion would affect the traffic. These government offices gave permission only 
after ascertaining that traffic disruptions would be minimal. They looked at the traffic volume and 
allowed construction only during the night hours when the traffic volume was low. Movement of 
equipment, such as transit mixers, cranes, trailers and boom placers, were also restricted to night 
time when traffic was much less dense.  
The airport posed a special challenge for the metro rail project due to the height restrictions 
that were required during construction to ensure a flight’s safe vertical clearance, which restricted 
the use of tall cranes. The project team had to change the construction methodologies for a few 
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stations because of restrictions on the use of tall cranes for lifting structural members. They used 
an approach of multiple launchings to reach the required height with a short crane. In spite of this, 
there were time restrictions on working at these heights so as to cause only minimum disturbance 
to air traffic. Unlike highway traffic, airport traffic was at its peak during the night hours as most 
international flights operated during this time. Even after repeated rounds of negotiations, the 
airport authority only agreed to allow six hours of work per week for construction of these stations. 
To facilitate coordination with the airport authorities, the project organization hired a manager 
who had construction work experience in two international airports in India to head construction 
and coordination along the airport stretch, even though he had no special metro rail experience. 
The manager knew many of the present employees of the airport and had a good relationship with 
the director of the airport, which improved coordination for the metro rail project. The project team 
had to change a 500-metre elevated section near an auxillary runway (as per the DPR) to an 
underground section complying with the request of the airport authority. The authority said that 
the section was too close to the runway to satisfy the vertical clearance requirements. There were 
height restrictions for two stations that were situated within the air funnel region. The project team 
changed the design from a curved roof to flat roof to accommodate the height restrictions. The 
authority also expressed concerns about the electronic interference that the 25KV electric supply 
on the viaducts might cause to the aircraft systems. The ABC project organization carried out a 
detailed electronic interference study with the help of a premier educational institute that 
concluded that no such electronic interference with the aircrafts would occur. Next, the airport 
authority said that moving trains would cause visual disturbance for pilots nearing the landing 
zone. Thus, FRP sheets with red and white stripes designed to restrict any visual disturbance to the 
pilots when they neared the landing zone were used to cover all the metro rail track sections that 
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were located under the air funnel region. An official who was involved in this coordination 
remarked, 
“They [Airport authority] have codal provisions for their flight zone that there should not be 
any visual disturbances during flight landing and taking off ... we [ABC project team] had a 
lot of meetings with airport authority and finally we together decided to use shielding ... they 
wanted it in red and white check colour ... this was not there in our initial design and was an 
extra work” 
The city has a suburban rail network that transports around 1.76 million people per day and is 
the lifeline of the city. The metro rail intended to connect to one of the main stations in this 
network. To do so, the ABC project organization planned a 105-metre concrete bridge above an 
operational suburban rail. When the project team approached the railway department for 
permissions to construct the bridge the railway authorities advised that concrete bridges were not 
permitted above the rails as a precautionary measure, due to the probability of heavy damage being 
sustained by the service below in case of collapse. The project team, amongst whom were 
engineers with expertise in designing bridges, proposed as an alternative the use of a steel bridge, 
which would create less damage in case of collapse and have lesser deflection compared to the 
concrete bridge. The expertise of these special talents helped the ABC project propose innovative 
design to persuade the railway department to accept the proposed solution. Thus, after multiple 
considerations of a suitable design for a long steel bridge, the railway authorities gave approval 
for a two-span open web steel bridge. While the planned cost for the bridge was INR 80 Million, 
it was completed at INR 210 Million. The construction permission for this bridge was restricted 
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for safety reasons to only three hours at night after the daily operation and maintenance schedule 
of the suburban rail network had been completed. 
 We see that the project team resorted to different strategies to deal with the external 
stakeholders in lands and existing services. From the ABC project discussed above, 27 different 
strategic practices pertaining to specific stakeholder management instances that spanned across 
stakeholder types, and the categories under which they were coded are consolidated in Table 1 for 
quick reference. 
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Table 1: Summary of stakeholder management strategies practiced in the ABC project case 
Sl No Practice  Strategy Category 
1 Market land rates paid for acquiring private land Give and take 
2 
Repeated visits to private land holders and inspired them to give up 
the land for public good 
Persuasion 
3 
Constructed a new temple in a new land with traditional temple 
contractors  
Give and take 
4 
Interconnectivity rationale for convincing other infrastructure services 
to give land 
Persuasion 
5 
Extra level of parking facility for airport employees in exchange for 
land rights 
Give and take 
6 Construct new station for railways in exchange for land rights Give and take 
7 
New design around the Indian Army land with sharper turns using a 
new methodology 
Flexibility 
8 
Get the deputy Chief Minister to talk with illegal land holders and 
convince them to leave the land 
Persuasion 
9 
Warned to acquire everything when illegal landholder without legal 
rights refused to give land required for construction 
Persuasion 
10 
No legal right 20m below owner’s land stating excavation of minerals 
as an example  
Persuasion 
11 
Designs altered to change the pier distance and address the land 
holders grievances  
Flexibility 
12 
59,000 trees and saplings planted and agreed to restore parks Extra work for 
stakeholders 
13 
Installed solar panels in metro stations and other accessible locations Extra work for 
stakeholders 
14 
Agreed to frequently monitor noise and vibrations levels and take 
adequate steps to keep them within permissible limits 
Extra work for 
stakeholders 
15 
Recruit people on deputation to get work done from their colleagues 
in government services 
Deputation 
16 
Built state of the art inspection chambers while shifting state-owned 
communication networks 
Extra work for 
stakeholders 
17 
Shift the water line using own funds Extra work for 
stakeholders 
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5. DISCUSSION 
The findings from the ABC project show that megaprojects experience different sets of interests 
and demands, depending on the external stakeholders involved. To manage these interests, the 
project team resorted to different emergent strategies. The analysis of the project team’s strategies 
and resource bases in the ABC project from a power perspective helps us understand how the 
project team combatted different types of stakeholder challenges in project settings.  
I. STRATEGIES IN PRACTICE FOR MANAGING EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS  
The project team used an emergent set of five strategies, each composed of distinct clusters of 
influence tactics. Each of these strategies is discussed below.  
18 
Pays funds to electricity board to shift the cables Extra work for 
stakeholders  
19 
Construct footing within available space when water lines could not 
be shifted 
Flexibility 
20 
Construction only during night hours where vehicular traffic is less 
and when suburban rail is not operational 
Flexibility 
21 
Used a complicated methodology near airport areas when big cranes 
could not be used 
Flexibility 
22 
Recruit talent who has relational experience with Airport authority to 
enable coordination 
Deputation 
23 Steel bridge design instead of concrete bridge over railway Flexibility 
24 A 500m section was changed to underground near the airport runway Flexibility 
25 
The tracks near air traffic funnel area was covered with FRP sheets 
to reduce visual hindrance to the pilots 
Extra work for 
stakeholders 
26 
Changed two stations from curved to flat top for satisfying the airport 
zone height limits 
Flexibility 
27 
Get educational institutes to certify that there is no electronic 
interference from 25 KV OHL lines near airport 
Persuasion 
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1. Persuasion – we see the project team use persuasion to convince the legal landholders who 
refused to move, even after providing market rate compensation through referring to a 
public good and using ‘inspirational appeals’ (Yukl & Tracey, 1992). The project team 
combined this inspirational appeal with some ‘pressure’ (Yukl & Tracey, 1992), ‘rational 
persuasion’ (Yukl & Tracey, 1992) and ‘consultation’ (Yukl & Tracey, 1992) to convince 
these landholders that the market rates would be an adequate compensation for their loss. 
The informal ‘coalition’ (Yukl & Tracey, 1992) with the government ensured that the 
Deputy Chief Minister came and spoke to the squatters, asking them to move elsewhere. 
The project team was able to persuade the airport authority by using experts from a premier 
education institute to convey that no electronic interference was posed by the 25KV power 
line on the viaducts. The literature backs these findings – the use of storytelling and framing 
strategies, for instance, can get work done in megaprojects (Matos et al, 2015). The 
‘persuasion’ strategy was widely deployed with all stakeholder groups as seen in Table 1. 
2. Deputation – coordination is a critical issue area for managing external stakeholders in 
megaprojects. The project team coordinated with external stakeholders by using employees 
deputed from the government agencies, such as, the electricity, highways, railways, 
telecommunication and police departments, following the co-optation strategy outlined by 
Selznick (1949) in the case of the TVA. These deputed employees, temporarily on the other 
side of the fence, were able to convince their own colleagues to coordinate effectively. In 
situations where deputation was not possible such as in the case of the airport, the project 
organization appointed managers who had worked in the government agency before and 
had a good relationship with them. Tapping into these existing circuits of power in the form 
of previous relations of membership proved to be a viable strategy. These employees on 
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deputation acted as boundary spanners (Mahalingam & Levitt, 2005) and helped 
coordination by gaining access to these agencies’ offices, complying with their 
bureaucratic procedures, getting insights into their concerns and interests and persuading 
these stakeholders through multiple rounds of negotiations until resolution of the issue was 
achieved. ‘Consultation’ was used with these government agencies as they were invited in 
planning the specifics of how the megaproject can be executed. The strategy of 
coordination with deputation builds on the tactic of ‘personal appeal’ (Yukl & Tracey, 
1992). Since, the deputation strategy worked with government agencies, the influence 
tactic of ‘personal appeal’, lying behind the specific strategy ‘deputation’, is one that can 
be used successfully with government employees. 
3. Give and take– with some stakeholders, the project team adopted a give and take strategy. 
Negotiating through diverse circuits of power, while acquiring lands from the airport 
authority, the project team permitted the construction of additional parking spaces for 
airport employees from the ABC project funds; in the case of railways, the project team 
constructed the station for the railway and the metro rail together in exchange for their 
rights to the land. With the give and take strategy, the project team entered into an 
‘exchange’ (Yukl & Tracey, 1992) following ‘consultation’ with the stakeholders to 
compensate them for the cost implications and this was particularly seen in land acquisition 
from the private and government legal landholders. With government stakeholders, 
‘exchange’ is used in combination with ‘personal appeal’ enabled by project team members 
on deputation.  
4. Extra work for stakeholders – for stakeholders who experienced service disruption issues 
during metro rail construction, the project team carried out extra work to speed up the 
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process of shifting services. Innovating circuits of power that by-passed those that were 
already bureaucratically seconded but which followed the rules of the bureaucracy while 
not making demands on their resources was a strategy that proved viable. For the state-
owned telecommunication agency, the ABC project organization had to move cables and 
also build state of the art inspection chambers as per the demands of the agency. For the 
community, the project team agreed to plant more trees and installed solar panels to 
compensate for the energy the metro system would be drawing from the grid. The ABC 
project organization secured cooperation for stakeholders in lands (excluding land 
acquisition) and existing services who were affected by activating a norm of reciprocity 
(see Gouldner 1960, for the classic statement). This strategy was enabled by the 
combination of ‘exchange’, ‘consultation’ and ‘personal appeal’ made by the project team 
members on deputation. While the ‘give and take’ strategy was accompanied by a contract 
that made the exchange formal, in contrast the strategy of ‘extra work for stakeholders’ 
was premised on more of a quid pro quo, enforced through more subtle means.  
5. Flexibility – In most cases, the designs suggested in the Detailed Project Report (DPR), the 
construction methods suggested in the work plan, and the work timings suggested in the 
project schedule would not have completely considered the concerns and interests of the 
external stakeholders. As the project team became aware of the many stakeholders who 
experienced disruption because of the project into whose circuits of power they became 
embroiled, they learned to accommodate resistance. Expression of these grievances 
changed the ways the design, methodology and schedule of the project evolved. The project 
team was able to change the design when land was not made available by the Indian Army. 
The construction methodology was changed by using small cranes to satisfy the airport 
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authority’s height restriction standards. To reduce disturbance to existing infrastructure 
services such as highways, railways and airports, the construction activities were re-
scheduled to take place only during lean traffic hours. Thus, this strategy of being flexible 
with regards to design and design intents was effective in accommodating stakeholder 
interests in the project and securing their support, as seen in Table 1. The strategy is based 
on a combination of ‘consultation’ to invite stakeholders in planning how the megaproject 
can be executed, ‘rational persuasion’ to convince the external stakeholders that a new 
design or new methodology addressed the concerns raised by them and ‘exchange’ by 
increasing the project’s cost in order to achieve continued stakeholder cooperation in the 
project and deflect resistance.  
We observed the use of all the influence tactics from the Yukl & Tracey framework (1992) in 
the megaproject with the exception of ingratiation, involving flattery, which was not observed in 
the inter-organizational project setup although it may have been deployed in more face-too-face 
situations to which we did not have access.  
II. RESOURCE-BASED POWER THAT ENABLES STRATEGIES  
Those strategies that were emergent were made possible only because of the existence of accessible 
resource bases rooted in underlying power structures. Figure 2 shows the resources used and their 
role in enabling specific strategies of the project team.  
1. Recruiting on a contractual basis – The project team were able to convince certain 
stakeholders using rational persuasion because the project organization hired employees 
on a contractual basis. In India, government officials are often concerned about being 
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investigated by anti-corruption agencies for paying extra compensation to landowners and 
tend to be very conservative in their calculations (Mahalingam & Vyas, 2011). However, 
since these project team employees were recruited on a contractual basis, they had more 
freedom to act. The project team paid market compensation to legal landowners and 
informed the landholders with illegal titles that the full land would be taken from them if 
they refused to give up land for construction, but if they cooperated then some partial 
element of the land would be made available. A government team member would not be 
able to give such assurances as their decision could be questioned or challenged in the 
future as not being in accord with the rules of rational legality. The employees recruited 
under contract had ‘legitimate’ power (French & Raven, 1959) to make offers and not be 
held accountable for doing so in terms of an existing bureaucratic precedent. The warning 
that non-compliance can lead to the full land being taken from them shows the use of 
‘coercive’ power by these employees. Supporting this, Mahalingam & Levitt (2005) note 
that where freelance expatriates are recruited on a contractual basis as part of the 
megaproject team they are able to make decisions that are not bound by the ‘shadow of the 
future.’ The contract-based employees had only one mandate: to complete the work as 
quickly as possible. Hence, their orientation to the megaproject was highly instrumental. 
2. Recruitment on the basis of secondment – The ‘deputation’ strategy was possible only 
because the project organization was able to accommodate people who were seconded from 
external stakeholder organizations who then acted on the basis of the ‘referent’ power 
(French & Raven, 1959) the organization enjoys. The megaproject had adequate political 
support and hence they could ask the state government to deputise staff from government 
agencies; these staff could use personal circuits of power in the project’s interests. As seen 
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in the case of illegal land holders, the ABC megaproject also specifically drew on existing 
power relations in terms of elected representatives, a significant referent power in Indian 
society. The strategy of ‘personal appeal’ worked exceptionally well in the case of deputed 
staff interfacing specifically with government agencies among the multiple categories of 
stakeholders, a significant contribution to understanding when to use what strategies. 
3. Fund discretion – Convincing stakeholders where there are cost implications is possible 
only because the ABC project organization had fund discretion. The ability to raise and use 
funds at their own discretion gives the organization a base with which to ‘reward’ (French 
& Raven, 1959) other players who support their cause. The discretion to use funds to build 
a new station for the railway department led the ABC project organization to apply for and 
receive land permits to construct their own metro rail station using the ‘give and take’ 
strategy. The discretion to use the metro rail funds to pay for shifting communication cables 
and building inspection chambers resulted in faster utility shifting as part of performing 
the ‘extra work for stakeholders’ strategy. The fund discretion also enabled the project team 
to adopt the costly ‘flexibility’ strategy. Rewards encourage ‘exchange’ tactics. 
4. Recruiting expert talents – The flexibility strategy that the project team used depended on 
the organization being able to recruit special talents, ‘experts’ (French & Raven, 1959) 
whose expertise helped provide innovative design ideas and enabled the ‘rational 
persuasion’ of stakeholders to accept these often-creative solutions. The organization 
recruited from other metro rail projects in India and worldwide, something that is not 
possible with other public projects whose specific recruitment policies do not allow such 
global recruitment. As an example of the utilization of this resource in combination with 
others discussed here, the ABC project organization went through multiple rounds of 
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negotiations to change the concrete bridge to a steel bridge over a suburban rail network, 
which was only possible with the combination of special talents, fund discretion and 
deputation.  
 
 
Figure 2: Strategies and resource-based power in megaprojects 
In summary, these four resources available to the project team formed the bases of power that 
allowed them to enact strategies to manage external stakeholders. Depicted in Figure 2, these 
resources can be consolidated into recruitment discretion (to recruit on a contract basis and recruit 
special talents), government backing (to recruit on deputation) and fund discretion. These 
resources available to the project team based on the covert structures of meaning enabled the overt 
strategic action seen in managing external stakeholders in line with the circuits of power theory 
(Clegg, 1989). The strategies and resources were only available to the project team during the 
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duration of the construction project, unlike in general management, where they exist for an 
indefinite period of time.  
6. CONCLUSION  
Our study contributes to our understanding of external stakeholder management in complex 
settings as exemplified by megaprojects. While extant research has documented ways in which 
stakeholder views can be managed (Aaltonen & Sivonen, 2009; Mastos et al, 2015; Kim & 
Mauborgne, 2003; Chinyio & Akintoye, 2008; Yang et al. 2014), our key contribution in this paper 
is to provide insights on how these strategies work by bringing in an organizational power 
perspective that is often ignored or underplayed. As shown in Figure 2, by studying the strategies 
used to manage external stakeholders and by investigating the resource bases available to the 
project organization we demonstrate how emergent strategies coalesce around influence tactics 
that use bases of power embedded in specific resources that project organizations use to manage 
external stakeholders. We therefore posit that changes in the resource base can trigger power 
circuits that significantly affect strategic action and, in turn, project outcomes. Thus, understanding 
of how and why project organizations use specific strategies to engage with stakeholders requires 
a critical appreciation of power relations and resources.  
Our aim was not to demonstrate methods that might eliminate all stakeholder issues in 
infrastructure megaprojects – we think that this is impossible – nor was it our intention to 
comprehensively document all the issues that a megaproject might face and all the resources and 
strategies available to the project team to manage them. Instead, the study theoretically documents 
and categorizes strategies used in relation to diverse external stakeholders in a metro rail 
megaproject. External stakeholders considered in our study can be classified as stakeholders in 
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lands and in existing services. To manage these external stakeholders, the project team resorted to 
five strategies: 1) persuasion, 2) deputation, 3) give and take, 4) extra work for stakeholders and 
5) flexibility, each of which in turn were composed of multiple influence tactics. The resources 
available to the project team for enabling these strategies are recruitment discretion, government 
backing and fund discretion.  
The study provides empirical validation of the link between strategies and power resources 
empowering the project team in dealing with the external stakeholders. Fund discretion enabled 
monetary support for ‘give and take’, ‘extra work for stakeholders’ and ‘flexibility’. Recruitment 
discretion enabled recruiting talents from other metro rail projects that had previously dealt with 
similar issues for ‘persuasion’ and ‘flexibility’. Government backing enabled the ‘deputation’ 
strategy. Articulating the level of analysis in organizational terms and addressing the circuits of 
power entailed significantly advances analysis that previously had looked at phenomena such as 
the direction of usage (Kipnis et al, 1980; Yukl & Tracey, 1992), sources of power (Yukl, et al., 
1996), the content of games in play (Yukl et al, 1999), culture (Fu & Yukl, 2000) and leader’s 
quality (Cable & Judge, 2003). We have distinguished between strategies deployed in relation to 
government and private organizations as personal appeal worked exceptionally well with 
government agencies.  
The work has some limitations. First, since a retrospective case study was used as the research 
methodology, only instances of overt resource-based power were evident. An in-depth 
ethnographic study could explore more covert power and the role of the institutional environment 
in the strategies used. Second, we cannot consider the categories of external stakeholders explored 
to be exhaustive or completely representative of megaprojects as we dealt with only stakeholders 
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in lands and existing services. There are other external stakeholder groups, such as special interest 
groups, courts, media etc., which were not considered in this paper. Also, in the study, we have 
observed that external stakeholder management strategies emerge based on the resources available 
with the project team as opposed to resources emerging based on the stakeholder characteristics 
and strategies employed. This may be peculiar to megaprojects because the cast of external 
stakeholders are relatively unknown at the start of the project (Mok et al. 2015). However the 
directionality of the strategy-resource link can be tested on other projects. Finally, since our case 
study was restricted to an infrastructure megaproject, we were not in a position to observe 
contextual nuances that would arise in other megaprojects such as an Olympic stadium or an 
Apollo mission. 
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